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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between scal consolidation,
business plans and rm investment. Based on a detailed narrative of tax
changes in Germany covering 40 years of scal adjustments, we dene and
exploit the exogenous variation of tax bills to quantify the eect of tax
changes on rm future investment plans as well as on realized investment.
We nd that rms in the manufacturing sector revise downwards their planned
investment by about 4% subsequently to a tax increase equal to 1% of the
value added in the total manufacturing industry. On the contrary realized
investment growth drops by around 8% at impact. Furthermore we nd that
income and consumption taxes are most harmful to investment and that
rms base their investment plans considering laws currently under discus-
sion, anticipating future tax changes. Not taking into account this anticipa-
tion eect would lead to strongly biased estimates.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal consolidation represents one of the main challenges that policy makers are
currently facing in most OECD countries. Understanding how dierent scal con-
solidation measures (i.e. spending cuts and tax increases) aect growth is there-
fore crucial. In a recent paper, Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2012) show em-
pirically that tax-based scal adjustments have a statistically signicant dierent
eect on output compared to spending-based adjustments. The former ones are
not only more costly in terms of output loss than spending adjustments, but they
can be also linked to longer-lived recessions. The macro analysis of Alesina,
Favero, and Giavazzi (2012) focuses on a large set of OECD countries and points
out that the strong eect of tax-based consolidation on output is driven by shifts
in business investment. Understanding further the links between scal consolida-
tion, business condence and rm investment is even more crucial in periods of
excessive debt and/or decit, when the economy needs an eective growth policy
agenda. Therefore, our analysis focuses on tax adjustments and tries to shed light
in the interconnection between tax adjustments, business condence and invest-
ment. Previous studies have been unable to capture the causal link between these
elements either due to the aggregate nature of the data, which does not allow
matching rm expectations with their investment behavior, or due to the endo-
geneity of the scal policy, as one of the key issues in estimating the impact of
economic policy is the identication of exogenous scal shocks.
To deal with the unavailability of rm investment expectations, previous lit-
erature focuses mainly on realized investment both at the macro and at rm level.
Alesina and Perotti (1996), using case studies, stress the "credibility eect" that
a decisive discrete change in the scal policy stance may have on interest rates
which would crowd in private investment. Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schi-
antarelli (1999) associate one percentage point of GDP increase in labor tax with a
decrease of aggregate investment over GDP by 0.17 on impact and a cumulative ef-
fect of about 0.7 in ve years. Conrming these results, Cloyne (2011), Mertens
and Ravn (2009), and Hayo and Uhl (2013) nd a negative, sizable and statisti-
cally signicant eect of tax increase on investments at the aggregate level. At
rm level, previous literature builds heavily on neoclassical models of investment
based on the user cost of capital and the Q-theory1. In the user-cost framework,
higher taxes aect investment negatively through the increase in user cost of cap-
ital. Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1996) exploit cross-sectional variation in
1See Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for a comprehensive overview of microeconometric models
of investment and employment.
2
user cost due to major tax reforms. They nd signicant eects with an implied
long-run elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the user cost between -
0.5 and -1.0 2. Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1998) analyze UK rm investment
behavior using both the underlying Q-theory and user cost of capital, and their
estimated eect reduces to -0.25. Finally, micro evidence based on cointegration
models ( Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995) among others) estimates an
average long-run relationship between capital-output ratio and the user cost of
-0.1, where estimates range between -0.01 and -2.
Regarding the second limitation, the identication of exogenous scal shocks,
the economic literature distinguishes three main methodologies. The rst branch
of literature follows the structural vector autoregressive approach (SVAR). In this
approach, exogenous scal shifts are unobservable and identication is achieved
using sign restrictions derived from economic theory ( Mountford and Uhlig (2009))
or by taking into account institutional features of tax and transfer systems ( Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002)). The VAR approach has led to a wide range of estimates
of the spending multiplier (see Ramey (2011) for a literature survey). The sec-
ond group of studies consists mainly of case studies ( Giavazzi and Pagano (1990),
Alesina and Ardagna (2010), and Alesina and Ardagna (2012)) nd that spend-
ing based adjustments can have a very small or no output cost at all. Finally, a
more recent method that found increasing attention in the economic literature is
the narrative approach. Identication is based on observable exogenous shifts in
scal stance by considering ocial documents, and hence by denition focusing
only on scal adjustments that are motivated by decit reducing purposes. As
pointed out in Mertens and Ravn (2013), an attractive feature of this approach is
that the narrative record summarizes the relevant features of a potentially very
large information set.
This paper aims at lling the above described research gap, investigating fur-
ther the set of correlations and causality between tax adjustments and private
investment, in order to provide clear insights on the impact of scal reforms on
rm incentives, and therefore on growth. In particular, we contribute to the de-
bate in three ways: Firstly, by considering micro level data we move one step
further in establishing a causal link between tax-based scal consolidation, busi-
ness condence and investment. Taking advantage of the information on rms’
planned investment provided by the IFO investment survey3, we are not only able
2Additional rm-level evidence on the user-cost elasticity of the investment rate is given by
Schwellnus and Arnold (2008) and Johansson (2008).
3EBDC Business Investment Panel, http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/EBDC.html
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to compare our micro-based results with the previous ndings from the macro lit-
erature, but also to take into consideration forward-looking behavior of the rms.
Secondly, the detailed structure of the dataset allows us to disentangle the eect
in two dierent dimensions: a heterogeneous eect depending on rm size and
on the industry sub-sector. In line with Romer and Romer (2010) and Pesca-
tori, Leigh, Guajardo, and Devries (2011), we employ the narrative approach to
identify exogenous tax adjustments. Based on a detailed narrative created by Uhl
(2013) for Germany, we revise 40 years of documented tax legislation (1970-2009)
in order to create a dataset of tax adjustments that are not cyclically driven nor
dictated by long-term growth considerations. We further investigate the timeline
of tax adjustment not only considering the publication date, as provided by Uhl
(2013), but also looking for the date when the public discussion of the adjustment
started. To do so, based on the LexisNexis database, we collect journalistic docu-
ments that discuss each of the tax changes we considered.
Finally, focusing on one country only, we are not only able to consider a much
more accurate policy dataset, testing the results for dierent shock reference dates
(discussion date, publication and rst implementation date) but also to disentangle
the eect according to the type of tax change (income tax, business and corporate
tax, or consumption tax). In fact, as pointed out in Mertens and Ravn (2013) and
Cloyne and Surico (2013), there is little reason to expect that the dierent types
of taxes available to governments all have the same impact on the economy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
series of exogenous tax shocks as developed by Uhl (2013), and which have been
adopted for the purpose of this paper, as well as the rm level investment data.
Section 3 describes in detail the identication and the estimation strategy, while
the main results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 further elaborates on het-
erogeneity and section 6 performs a series of robustness and sensitivity checks.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Tax shocks and rm investment data
Narrative of German tax changes
The series of tax changes is based on Uhl (2013), who elaborates an extensive
record of tax legislation in Germany4. In order to identify all relevant tax law
4The analysis in Uhl (2013) is based mainly on the Finanzbericht and Bundesnanzplan of the
Federal Republic of Germany. In order to recover all budgetary details of individual tax laws we re-
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changes Uhl (2013) uses in a rst step a size criteria of the budgetary impact of
tax changes. Tax shocks are thus considered important and are included in the
narrative if their budgetary impact reaches 0.1% of GDP in a given year5. This rst
criterion led to the identication of 95 important tax changes that are revised in a
detailed fashion in Uhl (2013) and that are classied according to their main mo-
tivation in "endogenous" and "exogenous" tax measures in line with the previous
literature (see for example Romer and Romer (2010), Pescatori, Leigh, Guajardo,
and Devries (2011) and Cloyne (2013))6.
Key in the narrative approach is to identify the exact motivation behind each
tax change, as this allows excluding tax policy changes dictated by business cycle
uctuations and changes correlated with the dependent variable throug other un-
observed factors. As pointed out in Romer and Romer (2010), simply regressing
output growth on all legislated tax changes will lead to biased estimates, given
the fact that some tax changes might be correlated with the error term. More-
over, this bias might be even more emphasized in case the researcher does not
account for the fact that the policy makers might adjust their policy measures to
the current state of the economy, for example employing countercyclical policies.
Even controlling in the regression framework for known macroeconomic shocks
and conditions would not solve the issue of identication, as rstly it would be
impossible to proxy for all information about future output movement that the
policy maker may have had and secondly the response to tax changes is likely to
vary from period to period and may be hence correlated with other unobserved
factors in the error term. Thus it is crucial to identify the exact motivation behind
individual tax changes.
We align our classication of the motivation of tax changes with Uhl (2013),
however we revise each of the Uhl tax shocks and regroup them according to
"exogenous" and "endogenous" for our analysis of investment. Uhl (2013) clas-
sied spending driven tax changes, countercyclical policies and tax changes due
to macroeconomic shocks as "endogenous" measures. On the other hand, "exoge-
nous" measures are those dealing with budget consolidation and structural con-
vised the Finanzbericht for the years 1970-2009 and the four-year budget plans (Bundesnanzplan)
for the time period 1990-2009.
5Tax shocks are also included if the measure is (close to but) below the 0.1% GDP threshold but
tax law changes consist of individual well dened measures. Other narratives, such as Pescatori,
Leigh, Guajardo, and Devries (2011) do not state a precise cuto rule, however for their full dataset
of scal adjustments, only 5 out of 173 fall below the 0.1% rule, none for Germany.
6As the previous literature building on the narrative approach we slightly abuse terminology
and consider "exogenous" all changes that are not systematically correlated with current or lagged
output and investment.
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siderations. While consolidation measures are related only to past spending and
are exogenous to the current macroeconomic stance, the category of structural tax
changes is more controversial as it includes both measures that aim at long-term
growth, incentivizing investment, as well as tax changes that have been induced
by court-rulings and that are hence unrelated to investment activity. Therefore,
building on the previous narrative-literature, in our reclassication we dene as
"exogenous" only those structural changes that are not cyclically driven nor mo-
tivated by long-term growth considerations and hence aimed at investment. The
appendix provides some examples of tax changes and their classications7.
Given the fact that we have exact information on the timing of individual tax
measures - the date the rst draft was introduced to the parliament, the date the
tax law was published and information on the public discussion in the newspa-
pers - we test for the impact at dierent dates. Dierently from other studies
that use this approach, we consider the budgetary impact at announcement. This
choice relieves us from dicult considerations regarding revisions that are po-
tentially correlated with investment and the contingent economic situation8 as
well as from potential measurement errors. Furthermore, to avoid heterogeneous
displacement eects, we focus on exogenous tax shocks that are announced and
implemented within the same period.9 Figure 1 depicts the full series of important
tax changes in Germany announced and implemented within the same period for
both "exogenous" and "endogenous" motivations for the period 1970-2009, using
half-yearly data frequency. As the graph shows clearly, endogenous tax changes
are on average larger and more frequent than the exogenous category. In total,
we count with 19 exogenous shocks and 31 endogenous ones. The correlation
between the two time series is 0.09, and is not statistically signicant (p-value of
0.53).
Given data availability our main analysis focuses on the period 1970-201010.
As explained in more detail in the following section, we group tax changes in both
yearly and half-yearly periods in line with our rm level investment data. The
original tax shock series, expressed in billions of Euros (governmental budgetary
7For a complete overview of all important tax measures in the Federal Republic of Germany, see
Uhl (2013).
8Examples of factors correlated with investment which could drive the revisions are: resistance
from trade unions, deterioration of the economic situation, etc.
9This is in line with the previous literature. See for example Mertens and Ravn (2011) that
exclude tax changes with implementation lag exceeding one quarter. In the robustness section we
also control for shocks that are announced but that are implemented in subsequent periods.
10Our last scal shock is observed in 2009, however we include one additional year of rm in-
vestment data to capture the lagged investment eect.
6
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
.0
2
.0
4
Fi
sc
al 
sh
oc
k [
%
 V
A 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
In
du
str
y]
1970h1 1980h1 1990h1 2000h1 2010h1
time
exogenous shocks endogenous shocks
Figure 1: Legislated tax changes. Half-yearly frequency
impact), has been rst deated using the gross xed capital formation deator for
the manufacturing industry11 and divided by total value added (VA) in the man-
ufacturing industry in 2005, in order to have the main regression variables at a
similar scale, which allows for easier interpretation of the coecients. The exoge-
nous shock series contains both positive and negative tax measures ranging from
-0.011 to 0.014 with a mean absolute impact of 0.002 and a standard deviation of
0.004.12
In terms of timing, focusing on the subset of exogenous shocks, the average
length from the date the draft of the law is introduced to the parliament and the
date of publication of the same is around ve months 13. On the other hand the
average time between publication and rst implementation of the tax measure is
two months. However a detailed revision of the shocks brings the fact to light that
most of the shocks are induced by a lengthy public discussion prior to the initi-
11The deator is based on STAN Industry Rev. 3, 2008 (OECD) Database. Investment and nancial
variables are deated in the same way.
12We use the mean absolute impact rather than the simple mean, given both positive and negative
shocks. Alternatively the mean impact of the 12 positive shocks has been 0.005 (0.004) shocks, and
for the seven negative shocks -0.004 (0.004).
13The exact draft date can only be reconstructed for shocks posterior to 1977.
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ation of the legal process of tax change. The media and newspapers report these
discussions and we refer to the date of the rst article mentioning as "discussion
date". In order to check for this possibility we look at the timing of news coverage
of tax measures prior to the draft date using the online database LexisNexis. We
nd that the average time lag between initial discussion of the tax measure and
its publication is one year. The appendix provides an overview table containing
discussion, draft and publication date of selected tax shocks14.
Firm investment data
Data on rm investment is obtained from the IFO investment survey (IVS). As
pointed out in Seiler (2012) the IVS was originally introduced in 1955 and con-
siders the manufacturing sector in Germany, however annual investment data is
available only from the mid 1960s onwards. While the initial questionnaire has
been distributed only once a year, from 1993 onwards the survey has been per-
formed bi-annually, in spring and autumn of the same year, leading to an even
richer data structure15.
The IVS questionnaire focuses mainly on rm investment activity and in-
cludes both forward and backward looking statements of realized and planned
investment. As the questionnaire includes only a small list of potential control
variables, the dataset has been enriched by the Economic and Business Dataset
Center (EBDC) with balance sheet data obtained from Amadeus and Hoppenst-
edt16. The merged investment data counts with a total of 202,368 observations
that belong to 5,590 rms. In principle the dataset is longitudinal however the
number of rm that exit at some point in time the panel is high, so that there
are few rms reporting the entire sample period. In terms of representativeness,
in 2009 the IVS sample covered 31% of all employment in the German manufac-
turing sector (7% of companies), with better representation of bigger rms (2% of
employment size class < 50 and 66% of employment class size >1000).17
For the purpose of our analysis, the original dataset has been rst converted to
Euros, using the xed Euro-DM exchange rate and then deated with the OECD
14Using LexisNexis, we were able to track back news coverage for tax adjustments for the period
1992 to 2010.
15Data previous to 1991 corresponds to West Germany, while data posterior to 1991 includes also
rm from former Eastern Germany.
16The exact merging procedure is described in Seiler (2012).
17The authors would like to thank Heike Mittelmeier and Christian Seiler from the EBDC for
providing this information regarding the IVS.
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deator for gross xed capital formation in the manufacturing industry. Further-
more we drop IFO sector 210 from the analysis, manufacture of mining products,
as it does not nd a clear correspondence in the ISIC manufacturing classication.
Converting the dataset to an annual data structure, and constructing the change
in realized investment as log dierence of investment at time t and investment at
time t−1, we are left with 64,310 observations belonging to 5,186 distinct rms18
19
Most of the literature dealing with rm level investment considers as depen-
dent variable the ratio of investment (dened as the change in capital stock) over
capital. Even though the IFO data provides a direct measure of investment, it does
not provide us with an initial capital stock20. Therefore, as alternative measure
we normalize investment by rm specic average asset stock over the sample pe-
riod, which is available for the subset of rms that have been merged with the
Amadeus and Hoppenstedt databases. Nevertheless also this procedure reduces
the sample coverage considerably. Therefore we use this specication only as
robustness check for our ndings, estimating a dynamic rm-level investment
model as derived in Bond, Harho, and van Reenen (2005) (see section 6).
Our empirical analysis focuses both on realized investment growth and on
updates of planned investment. However updates of planned investment are only
available for the subsample period 1993-2010, in which the IVS has been con-
ducted at a bi-annual frequency. In each round rms are asked to provide an
estimate for their planned investment for the same year. In addition, in spring
rms are asked how much they have been investing in the previous year (realized
investment in t − 1) and, in autumn, how much they are planning to invest next
year (t+ 1). Therefore the richness of the IFO investment dataset allows us con-
sidering both realized investment changes and updates in planned investment.
18Conditioning our sample on rms that report in two consecutive periods does not change
signicantly the size composition: For the full sample (sample in dierences) there are 17.6% (15.6%)
in size group up to 49 employees, 31.9% (31.2%) in size group up to 199 employees, 34.7% (35.8%) in
the size group up to 999 employees and 15.8% (17.3%) in the category >1000.
19We allow for zero growth in case a rm reports zero investment in two consecutive years. As
robustness check we further experiment with a second specication, imputing a small, but positive
number for investment in years t or t-1 in case a rm reports in either of the two periods zero
investment. Given that this procedure leads to additional variability, for the analysis we cut the
variable at the rst and 99th percentile to make the measure outlier proof. We nd that our results
are not aected by the specication of the dependent variable.
20Backtracking the capital stock using inventory methods would be only meaningful for balanced
data or data with few gaps.
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Formally, realized investment growth in year t is dened as:
∆ln(It) = ln(It,A) − ln(It−1,A) (1)
while the change in planned investment is dened for reference year t, respec-
tively in each period p=1 between 1 October (t-1) and 31 March (t) and p=2 be-
tween 1 April (t) and 30 September (t), as:
∆ln(PIt,1) = ln(PI
t
t,S) − ln(PI
t
t−1,A) (2)
∆ln(PIt,2) = ln(PI
t
t,A) − ln(PI
t
t,S) (3)
where the subscript indicate the year and the survey round (S=spring, A=autumn)
when the plan is revealed, while the superscript refers to the forecast horizon, i.e.
the year the investment is supposed to take place. The exact timing of the half-
yearly investment structure is depicted in Figure 6 in the appendix.
2.1 Summary statistics and representativeness
Table 1 shows the main variables of interest for our analysis at annual frequency
for the full sample period and two subsample periods 1970-1990 (West Germany
only) and 1991-2010. The main dependent variable, realized investment growth is
small in absolute terms, however as the standard error suggests there exists con-
siderable variation across rms. The alternative measure (investment over aver-
age capital stock) has a mean of 0.25 (median of 0.18), which however includes
more bigger rms. The exogenous scal shock measured in terms of total value
added in the manufacturing industry is very similar for the two time periods in
terms of the average, however the standard error in the later period (1991-2010)
is almost the double. For comparative purposes Table 1 also reports the aggregate
control variables for the interest rate as well as sales growth and rm size (number
of employees), as these variables are reported for all rms in the questionnaire 21.
While the interest rate has been around 1% higher in the early subsample (1970-
1991), average sales growth was nearly double compared to the second sample
period. These tendencies are related to general structural changes in the German
economy.
In order to provide further evidence on the representativeness of our data,
Figure 7 in the appendix compares realized changes in aggregate investment in
21As mentioned, other nancial covariates, such as assets and liabilities, are only available for a
subset of rms (those listed in either Amadeus or Hoppenstedt and that could be merged).
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Mean% std Mean% std Mean% std
Realized%investment%change 20.0110 (21.046) 0.0297 (0.965) 20.0424 (1.104)
Investment%/%Average%total%assets 0.2520 (0.229) 0.2580 (0.234) 0.2487 (0.226)
Exogeneous%fiscal%shock 0.0011 (20.006) 0.0013 (0.004) 0.0010 (0.007)
3%month%interbank%rate 2.4670 (21.616) 3.0911 (1.904) 2.0205 (1.186)
Sales%growth 0.0231 (20.261) 0.0312 (0.225) 0.0164 (0.288)
Total%employment%last%year 837 (5195) 948 (5247) 753 (5154)
Observations 64310 27936 36374
Note:%Investment%/%Average%total%assets%counts%with%a%total%of%39751%observations.
Total&sample:&197002010 Subsample:&199102010Subsample:&197001990
Table 1: Summary statistics: main variables
the manufacturing sector in Germany obtained from STAN (OECD, Rev.3 2008)
with aggregation based on our sample data. The gure indicates that the series
co-move closely over the entire sample period but that our aggregation based
on rm data shows slightly more variability than the ocial statistics. Further-
more the appendix provides some rst evidence for the negative correlation of
our scal shock measure and aggregate investment growth. The two series show
a correlation coecient of -0.15 (Figure 8). We present the same evidence by ISIC
3 industry sub-sector and by size group (Figure 9 and Figure 10 in the appendix).
3 Identication and empirical specication
As pointed out above, the key assumption behind the narrative approach is that
both the tax changes itself and their composition are "exogenous" i.e. tax changes
are not dictated by business cycle uctuations nor long-term growth concerns.
In line with the previous literature (see for example Cloyne and Surico (2013)),
we test for exogeneity using a four-variable VAR at annual frequency including
the tax shock series (for both the endogenous and exogenous category), GDP
growth, the three month interbank rate and the average investment change as
main dependent variable 22. We construct the aggregate change in investment as
log dierence of average investment in period t and t-1 weighted by employment
shares 23. The selection-order criterion suggests in most specications unani-
22In an alternative specication, we also account for the structural break due to the German
reunication (1990) and the recent nancial and economic crisis (post 2007); our results are robust
to the inclusion of these exogenous dummies.
23We also test for other measures of aggregation, using changes in total investment from period
t to period t+ 1, and hence conditioning on rm presence in two consecutive years, or using sim-
ple unweighted average investment change. The main results hold for all denitions of aggregate
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mously a lag structure of order one for the VAR. Table 3 in the appendix provides
evidence from the granger causality tests, showing that the exogenous tax shock
series implemented in the same period of the publication date cannot be predicted
neither by macroeconomic conditions in the last year, nor by past investment ac-
tivity. On the other hand, the "endogenous" tax adjustments can be predicted by
economic growth (p-value 0.063). The three excluded series jointly (investment
growth, GDP growth and interest rate) moreover carry information to forecast
the endogenous scal shock series at 10%. These results strongly support our key
identication assumptions 24.
As second test for exogeneity of our scal shock series we run an ordered pro-
bit regression to see if the government’s decision to adjust taxes can be predicted
by past macroeconomic data. The same approach has been taken by Cloyne and
Surico (2013) and Mertens and Ravn (2009). We hence construct an indicator vari-
ableωt equal to 1 if the government implements a positive scal shock, zero if no
action has taken place and -1 if there has been a negative scal adjustment. Results
are presented in Table 4 in the appendix and indicate that while movements in the
exogenous shock cannot be predicted neither by lagged changes in aggregate in-
vestment nor by lagged levels of GDP, the endogenous shocks are correlated to
lagged investment growth. As additional test, we run the ordered probit model
on ocial data from the manufacturing sector (Table 5) using both changes in
gross xed capital formation (GFCF) and levels of GFCF from the OECD (STAN)
database. While the results for GFCF growth are fully comparable with our in-
sample ndings (only lag 2 of GFCF growth) is signicantly correlated with the
endogenous shock, for the levels equation we nd strong evidence that move-
ments in the endogenous series are highly correlated with both lagged levels of
investment and GDP. The shocks that have been classied "exogenous" on the
other hand are not predictable.
Using the exogenous tax adjustment series, our analysis rst focuses on the
revision of investment plans, and secondly, we study how realized investment is
aected. Both analysis are based on the following main regression specication:
∆Ii,j,t = α+ βm(Lm)τt +ψmt−1 + ρgt−1 + ν∆zi,t−1 +D90 +D07 + θj + i,j,t
(4)
investment. We furthermore test that the investment series are stationary, using an augmented
Dickey-Fuller test.
24Given the fact that our tax shock series includes both structural and consolidation motivated
shocks, as sensitivity check, we furthermore exclude all shocks with structural motivation. The
presented ndings are robust to the selection of shocks.
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where∆Ii,j,t is the growth rate of realized investment for rm i, in sector j, in
period t. The investment changes are dened separately for realized and planned
investment as introduced in section II. The scal shock τt is the exogenous tax
adjustment published at time t, and is uncorrelated with other shocks to invest-
ment by construction. Macro-level controls consist of the monetary policy stance
mt−1 (previous period three-month interbank rate) and economic condition gt−1
(lagged levels of GDP). Dummies to account for the crisis period 2007-2010 (D07)
and for the structural change 1990 (D90) are included in the regression equation25.
Finally, lagged sales growth at rm level (∆zi,t−1) is part of the regression con-
trols to proxy for current and future demand conditions at rm level. In all speci-
cations we include furthermore sectorial xed eects θj and standard errors are
clustered at rm level 26
4 Main regression results
The following section presents the main regression results for both planned and
realized investment growth at rm level. Table 13 in the appendix also provides
some evidence for the eect of scal shocks on realized investment changes ag-
gregated at sub-sector level.
Planned Investment
As previous contributions have suggested (see for example Alesina, Favero, and
Giavazzi (2012)), business condence and private investment are found to be the
main drivers of the output eect of scal consolidation. Studying the change in
future investment plans at micro level helps to understand and pin down the busi-
ness expectation and condence channel. As mentioned in section 2, in the IVS
rms are asked about their investment plans for next period. Given the opportu-
nity cost of investments, these plans, and in particular their revisions, incorporate
business expectations and anticipation about future economic and policy condi-
tions.
25To account for the structural break in the statistical data more than the actual historical date
of the German reunication.
26Given the fact that our main explanatory variable is aggregated at annual level, we potentially
could cluster on years, however clustering on year assumes that rm level errors are uncorrelated
from one year to another, an assumption that is unlikely to hold. Alternatively we test for clustering
at industry sub-sector (branch). The main ndings are unaected by the choice of the clustering
variable.
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Insert Table 6 here
We observe updates on planned investment for the period 1993 to 2010 at a
bi-annual frequency. For this period, we count with a total of 10 exogenous scal
shocks with a mean impact of 0.001 and a standard deviation of 0.0048. Moreover
given the fact that our analysis focuses on the announcement eect of scal pol-
icy, we use the shock publication date. Table 6 presents the estimates of the eect
of a tax change equal to 1% of total manufacturing value added on the revision
of planned investment. Block 1 (column (1) - (3)) includes only lags of the scal
shock, while block 2 (column (4) - (6)) includes also leads. For the rest, the two
blocks include the same set of covariates: the rst column of each block includes
a set of aggregate controls (lagged GDP, lagged three month interbank rate, and
a dummy accounting for the recent nancial crisis) in addition to industry xed-
eects, the second column includes additionally lagged rm level sales growth,
and nally the third column includes rm level xed eects. In all specications
we furthermore include a separate dummy for the second half-year (autumn), in
order to account for potential dierences in volatility of the two revisions27, which
results to be highly signicant in all specications.
Block 1 shows that there is a signicant and negative eect of tax shocks on
planned investment. A shock equal to one standard deviation of the exogenous
scal shock28 hence translates to a decrease in planned investment of around 1.2%
in the next investment plan. Once we additionally include leads, in order to test
for a potential anticipation eect in block 2, the lagged eect on planned invest-
ment becomes quantitatively larger. We furthermore conrm that agents antic-
ipate the scal adjustment as both lead 1 and 2 show up to be signicant in all
three specications. Note additionally that all control variables (but lagged GDP
in some specications) show up to be statistically signicant with the expected
sign. The R2 is low even when including rm level xed eects, which indicates
that investment changes are indeed very lumpy and volatile 29.
The forward looking behavior of the rms can be explained by the average
length of the legislative process for tax changes in Germany. To test this hypoth-
27Due to a lower degree of uncertainty, the autumn investment update might be more accu-
rate and hence less volatile than the spring update. The authors would like to thank Antonello
d’Agostino for pointing this out in his discussion at the Banca d’Italia Fiscal Policy workshop 2014.
28As the shock can take on both positive and negative values, we standardize using a standard
deviation measure. Alternatively we could use the mean of the absolute shock impact in order to
quantify the shock impact on investment growth, which is very similar in magnitude.
29Note furthermore that the R2 from the rm level xed eect regressions, column (3) and (6)
are adjusted and hence lower than the other columns, that report an unadjusted regression t.
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esis we investigate in a more detailed fashion the legislative timing, starting from
the moment when the draft of the law is discussed in the public (media coverage in
major German newspapers and news magazines). Therefore we search for news
contents related to the discussion of scal shock measures employing the database
LexisNexis 30. In fact we nd clear evidence that between the time of public dis-
cussion and publication of the law, on average, there passes one year. Compared
to the draft date, the date when the law is ocially introduced in the parliamen-
tary discussion, the public discussion happens around half a year earlier. Table 2
in the appendix provides an overview of mayor exogenous tax shocks since 1992
including their ocial publication dates, draft dates and periods of public discus-
sion in the media (discussion dates). Given these ndings, we re-estimate our
main regression model focusing on the discussion date as "true" announcement
date of the shock.
The results are reported in Table 7. We nd that once we consider the media
discussion date, controlling for rm-level sales growth or using rm-level xed
eects, no forward lag shows up to be signicant. In fact compared to the publi-
cation date, the scal shock is only signicantly (and negatively) correlated with
changes in planned investment at impact, i.e. when the news is announced. 31
Generally, using the discussion date, we nd quantitatively similar, but more sta-
ble eects of downward revision of -3.5% to -4% for a shock equal to 1% value
added in the manufacturing industry. A shock equal to one standard deviation
hence led to a downward revision of investment plans by 1.9% for the sample pe-
riod 1993-2010.
Insert Table 7 here
To sum up, when rms make their plans for next period investment, they are
inuenced by laws currently under discussion and laws published in the previous
half year. Given the fact that we are interested in identifying the announcement
eect of scal consolidation measures on planned and realized investment, we
hence use the discussion date as main specication in the remaining sections of
this paper.
30LexiNexis contains all major German newspaper and covers news contents from the beginning
of the 1990s.
31We also tried alternative specications including additional lags up to lag 4, but the only sig-
nicant impact remains at lag zero.
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Realized investment
After analyzing rm behavior in terms of investment expectation, it is interesting
to apply a similar analysis to realized investment in order to be able to compare
our ndings with the previous macro-level results. We consider rms’ annual in-
vestment growth from 1970 to 2010 as dened in section 2. Table 8 presents the
point estimates of the eect of a tax change equal to 1% of total manufacturing
value added on investment growth. Column (1) does not include any controls
while column(2) includes aggregate controls and column (3) furthermore lagged
sales growth at rm level. Column (4) presents the results for realized investment
for the period 1991-2010, while column (5) for the earlier period and Western Ger-
many alone (1970-1990).
Insert Table 8 here
Interestingly, we nd that the scal shock has a negative and signicant im-
pact on realized investment that is strongest in the year of public discussion32 but
has also a lagged eect. The initial impact is stable to the inclusion of additional
aggregate and rm level controls (column 2 and 3), however once we include the
set of controls, we nd a more persistent eect. Adding up the signicant lags
in column 3, the total impact of a one percent tax shock on investment growth
is around -15.6%, which however is smaller when evaluated at the mean absolute
impact or the standard deviation measure: -5.7%. In fact, for the annual shock se-
ries, there are a total of 19 scal shocks with a mean value of 0.0007 and a standard
deviation of 0.0037. All aggregate control variables show up to be signicant and
show the expected sign. The sample split in column 4 and 5 suggests two clearly
dierent patterns: while in the more recent period 1991-2010, the scal shock
shows quantitatively the same impact as for the entire sample period (-8.8%), the
earlier subsample shows a signicant lagged eect that is biggest at lag 1. As for
the half yearly analysis there are 10 shocks for the subsample post 1991, with a
mean impact of 0.00096 (0.0047) and 9 shocks for the rst subsample referring to
column 5 with a mean impact of 0.0004 (0.0027). Hence the dierent scal policy
over the period considered translates into bigger an more volatile shocks in more
recent years. In addition to dierences in the scal shock series, rms might have
changed their behavior over the last 20 years, using more technology and respond
faster to changes in the companies legal and scal environment.
32Using as true announcement date the date of public discussion as introduced in the previous
section.
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Generally, the results are in line with the macro level ndings even though
the magnitudes are not directly comparable. Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2012)
for instance nd that a one percent GDP tax shock has a negative and signicant
lagged eect on xed capital formation growth in Germany that increases from
-4% in the rst quarter after the adjustment to around -6% one year after the ad-
justment. In fact, while in the macro literature the shock is standardized by GDP,
in our micro set-up it makes more sense to re-scale the expected budgetary impact
using the value added of the total manufacturing sector. Moreover, another dif-
ference between our framework and the macro analysis is the dierence in timing.
In order to verify that scal shocks, dened as exogenous, are not correlated
with the shocks that were announced in the past but implemented at time t, we
reestimate our regression model including both the previously announced shocks
and in a second step also the shocks that we classied as endogenous. Running our
main specication (column (3), containing both aggregate and rm level controls),
and including the shocks previously identied as endogenous, we get results very
much in line with those presented in Table 7. While the leads do not show up to
be signicant, at impact we estimate an eect of -7.65, at lag1 of -5.87 and at lag
2 of -2.95, all signicant at 1%33. On the other hand, including the anticipated tax
shocks, we conrm these ndings: while the leads are not statistically signicant,
at impact we estimate an eect of -8.29, at lag1 of -6.39 and at lag2 of -4.89. These
ndings can be seen as a rst robustness check for our main regression results.34
While section 5 reports the results for heterogeneity of realized investment
changes depending on type of tax adjustment, rm size and the sub-sector of the
manufacturing industry, section 6 performs further robustness checks, providing
also evidence for the negative and signicant eect of tax adjustments using a
rigorous dierence-in-dierence strategy that allows us controlling for other un-
observed factors potentially correlated with the scal shock series and investment
growth.
33This results hold independent of the inclusion of control variables.
34Table 13 presents the eects of scal consolidation at industry level, provides similar evidence.
Including previously announced shocks or shocks considered endogenous does not alter our main
ndings.
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Figure 2: Exogenous tax adjustments; by type of tax
5 Heterogeneous eects
The long time span of available data for realized investment growth allows us
studying the eect of tax changes by looking at three main dimensions: type of
tax adjustment, heterogeneous eects by rm size and by manufacturing sub-
sector as well as their interactions.
Looking at GDP per capita, Johansson (2008) nd that corporate taxes are
most harmful for growth, followed by personal income taxes and consumption
taxes. To test for the eect of exogenous tax changes on realized investment we
group the shocks in dierent categories. As depicted in Figure 2, we distinguish
three main tax categories:
• personal income tax, pension & savings tax
• corporate & business tax, energy tax, property tax
• consumption tax
Breaking down the tax shock into these subcategories, we are able to distinguish
11 tax measures for the rst category, 11 for category two and 7 for the third cate-
gory. In order to identify these categories we revised a total of 42 tax law changes
18
that consist of 184 individual tax measures.
Insert Table 9 here
Including the three scal shock series in our reduced form estimation, both
in the same regression (Table 9, column 1) and in separate regressions, we nd
important dierences with respect to the previous estimates found in Johansson
(2008): consumption tax shocks have a strong negative and lagged impact, while
tax adjustments aecting income tax seem to have the biggest impact within the
same year. Property and corporate taxes, on the other hand, have a smaller eect
at impact. These ndings support a recent hypothesis35 which highlights the im-
portance of the demand channel for the transmission of scal shocks. Consump-
tion taxes aect demand and consequently rms’ investment in the successive
periods through future demand expectations.
In order to compare our results with the aggregate ndings on realized invest-
ment (section 4), we look at the standard deviation measure of the distinct cate-
gories of scal shocks and nd that while income (0.0021) and property (0.0022)
adjustments nearly have the same variability, consumption shocks are smaller,
almost half (0.0011). Using the estimated coecients from column (1) this leads
to an eect of a standard deviation scal adjustment on investment growth of -
4.1% for income tax, -1.76% for property tax and -1.9% for consumption tax. In
order to contrast these results, we aggregate scal shocks in an alternative way,
considering income and property tax as direct taxes and the consumption tax as
indirect taxes. Results are presented in Table 10 and show the same pattern that
is stable to the inclusion of additional controls, xed eects and also to the inclu-
sion of previously excluded tax shocks. While direct taxes show a negative eect
at impact, indirect taxes only lead to a downward revision of realized investment
in the subsequent period, and hence providing further evidence for the demand
channel hypothesis.
Recent rm-level literature has furthermore stressed the importance of con-
sidering heterogeneous and distributional eects of scal and other policies in
general. To test for dierent impact in terms of rm size we use the IFO rm class
sizes of employees (1-49, 50-199, 200-999, >1000) and run the regression for each
subgroup separately. Given the potential residual correlation across size classes,
35See for example the discussion of Aghion and Kharroubi (2013) at the annual BIS conference
(June 2013) by Reichlin.
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we adopted a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework. The results high-
lighted in Figure 3 show that at impact all size classes are negatively and signi-
cantly aected by the tax adjustment. Furthermore the eects are larger for rms
that belong to size group 1 to 3. The largest rms show the smallest coecient.
Moreover we conrm that the lagged eect is present for all size classes but for
the smallest rms (size group 1), where lag1 does not show up to be signicant.
This nding might be due to the fact that the smallest group is highly heteroge-
neous, as it is also suggested by the wide condence band. The magnitude of the
eect is in line with the aggregate ndings for the impact and slightly larger for
lag1.
In a next step, we investigate if distinct tax shocks have dierent eects by
rm size. The tax eects might dier by size group as rm size is also a proxy for
the legal status. Figure 4 shows the results for direct and indirect tax shocks at
impact and for lag1 for the distinct size groups. As pointed out above, given the
strong heterogeneity in the smallest size group, we cannot conrm any signicant
eect for either tax category. On the other hand we can conrm the main pattern
that we found when looking at type of tax shocks. Direct tax adjustments have a
negative impact at lag 0 that is quantitatively smaller than the impact for indirect
(consumption) taxes at lag 1. Furthermore the impact is larger for smaller rms
(coecient for size group 2 > size 3 > size 4, for both direct and indirect taxes),
which might indicate that smaller rms are on average more credit constraint and
hence a scal shock translates to a stronger eect (see Zwick and Mahon (Work-
ing Paper) for recent evidence from the US).
A nal dimension of heterogeneity that we test is the response by sub-sectors
of the manufacturing industry. For that purpose, we divide the rms in our sample
into 12 sub-sectors based on the two-digit ISIC 3 classication with some aggre-
gations36. We apply the same SUR methodology as used for rm size, and regress
investment growth on contemporaneous and lagged scal shocks, including fur-
thermore our set of control variables. The results for lag 0 are displayed in Figure
5 37. We nd that almost all sub-sectors show a negative and signicant impact
at lag 0, but the sub-sectors "food, beverages & tobacco", "leather", "non-metallic
36The manufacturing industries covered are food, beverages and tobacco (1516), textiles and
wearing apparel (1718), Leather industry (1900), wood (2000), pulp, paper and printing (2122), chem-
ical, rubber, plastics and fuel products (2325), other non-metallic mineral products (2600), basic met-
als and fabricated metal products (2728), machinery and equipment n.e.c. (2900), machinery and
equipment (3033), transport equipment (3435) and manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling (3637).
37For lag one we only nd a signicant (and negative) eect for sub-sectors 1718, 2122, 2900, and
3033.
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Figure 3: Heterogeneous eect by rm class size
mineral products", and "transport equipment"38. The signicant coecients range
from -5 to -11 and are hence in line with our previous ndings.
Using the narrative identication for scal shocks allows us considering and
aggregating a wide range of shocks, and thus identifying a robust average eect
of tax adjustments; however, at the same time, and given the shock heterogeneity,
the narrative approach makes it dicult to pin down a single channel.
6 Robustness checks
6.1 Sensitivity analysis
In addition to the rst model checks presented in the main section, we further
elaborate on robustness in the present section. First, given the strong impact that
the recent nancial and economic crisis had on the economic activity in Germany
(negative changes in realized investment of around 30 % in 2009 alone), a rst sen-
sitivity check consists of excluding the period 2007-2010 from our analysis. As
38While "food, beverages & tobacco" are a very heterogeneous group of rms, "leather" and "non-
metallic mineral products" are very small and specialized sub-sectors within the German manufac-
turing industry. The fact that we do not nd a signicant eect for the transport equipment sector
might be related to the strong export orientation of this sub sector, which includes the entire Ger-
man car industry.
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Figure 4: Heterogeneous eect by size and tax type
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Figure 5: Heterogeneous eect by ISIC sector classication: at impact
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pointed out in the methodological section, in the original regression specication
we already control with a dummy for the recent crisis period, however excluding
the period completely represents a good robustness check for our ndings. Drop-
ping the period post 2007, we are left with 38950 observations. For our preferred
regression specication, including both aggregate and rm-level controls we nd
that the leads are not predictable and that the estimated coecients for the scal
shocks show the same sign and magnitude as before: -8.76, -5.54, and -3.05 for lag
0 to lag 2.
Another important robustness check is to exclude the biggest single sub-sector
within manufacturing (manufacture of machinery and equipment) and to see if
our results are stable. Dropping 17,710 observations from the annual dataset does
not aect our results to an important degree and the estimated coecients are
directly aligned with our analysis of annual realized investment changes: -7.99,
-4.21, and -2.96 for lag 0 to lag 2. Moreover, given the potential concern that struc-
tural shocks dier from consolidation shocks in their nature, i.e. they are based
on "structural" considerations, these shocks might be correlated to past output
and investment levels. We hence exclude them from our regression analysis and
re-estimate the model using only shocks that are labeled unambiguously consol-
idation shocks in both Uhl (2013) and our classication. Again, our results are
strongly aligned with the ones presented previously.
Finally, and in order to follow the literature on rm level investment, we model
rm investment as in Bond, Harho, and van Reenen (2005). We hence estimate
a dynamic model of rm investment focusing on the investment rate rather than
on investment growth 39. Due to data availably, we normalize investment by av-
erage assets of the company rather than by the capital stock at time t − 1. The
investment model species that current investment, the dependent variable, is
explained by lagged investment, current and lagged sales growth, levels of sales,
current and lagged cash ow to capital ratio and the second lag of the dierence
between capital stock and sales (k− y). As explained in Bond, Harho, and van
Reenen (2005), for consistency with the error correction specication, we require
the coecient of (k−y) to be negative. For stability we furthermore require that
the coecient of lagged investment is lower than one in absolute terms.
As the investment rate depends on investment in the previous period, the
model has to be estimated by general method of moments (GMM) 40. Given the
39The interested reader is referred to Bond, Harho, and van Reenen (2005), where the error
correction model of rm investment is derived in detail.
40For eciency considerations, we adopt the system GMM approach as in Bond, Harho, and
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fact that the GMM estimator is a large N, small T estimator, we focus on the sam-
ple period 1991 to 2004 in order to maximize the numbers of tax shocks and rm
observations, but repeat the exercise for the full sample with very similar nd-
ings. In a rst step, we estimate the model as in Bond, Harho, and van Reenen
(2005), including time xed eects, in order to account for the economic cycle
and other unobserved factors (Table 11, column 1). In order to estimate the ef-
fect of our annualized scal shocks, we replace the time xed eects by aggregate
controls (column 2) and conrm that the main results do not change. Finally, the
scal shock is included in column (3). Similar to our previous ndings on invest-
ment growth, we nd a negative and signicant eect for scal shocks on the
investment rate at impact and lag1. The coecients can be interpreted as a 1%
tax adjustment in terms of VA in the manufacturing industry leads to a decrease
in investment by -1.4% at impact and -1.1% at lag one, and hence a total aggregate
eect of -2.5%. The test statistics for column 3 indicate that the Hansen-statistic
of non-valid instruments can be rejected, while the model shows clear evidence
of autocorrelation only at lag1.41.
Additional evidence on causality
Using a narrative identication strategy for scal shocks should overcome any
type of endogeneity by construction. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the micro-
level dataset and the detailed shock breakdown, we can provide further evidence
that the investment response is indeed driven by the scal shock and that there
are no unobserved factors driving the investment response, using a dierence-
in-dierence approach. In order to do so, we focus on one specic type of shock
that is likely to aect only some sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry. This
identication strategy can help us to get closer to a causal interpretation of in-
vestment impact of scal consolidation.
For this purpose, we focus on tax changes that aect the cost of energy. Our
assumption is that controlling for a set of aggregate and rm level factors, some
energy intensive sectors will be highly aected by this type of tax adjustment,
while other sectors will not respond to this tax change. Key is that both sectors,
van Reenen (2005)
41As additional model check we ignore the potential correlation between lagged investment and
the error term and estimate the investment equation by both OLS and xed eect regression. Given
the induced bias the true value for lagged investment should be in-between the two naive ap-
proaches. We nd that his is the case with an OLS estimate of 0.45 and FE estimate of 0.09 for the
lagged investment coecient.
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belonging to the manufacturing industry, share the same unobserved trends and
hence any dierence in outcome can be assigned to the eect of the tax shock. The
pulp and paper industry seems a good candidate to test this hypothesis, given its
high energy dependence42. As control groups we consider the food and tobacco
industry (ISIC 1516) and the group of non-classied manufacturing (ISIC 3637).
Even though some rms in the food and tobacco industry might be dependent on
energy in their production process, both control sectors are highly heterogeneous
in terms of products and production processes and hence it is likely for energy
tax changes not to show any aggregate eect.
Our "treatment" group "paper" consists of 10,357 observations and the com-
bined group of "controls" has a total of 10,946 observations for the sample period
1970-2010. For this period we count a total of 4 energy shocks43. Investment
change for the entire sample period for the control group has a mean value of
-0.012 (1.01) and for the treatment group 0.001 (1.36). The regression results are
reported in Table 12, where the rst column (1) refers to a pooled regression,
column (2) includes xed eects for the individual sub-branches summarized in
the two categories, and column (3) includes rm level xed eects. The results
show that there exists a strong negative lagged eect for pulp and paper, while
the control sector does not show any signicant response to energy tax increases.
Adding rm level xed eects in column (3) alters the estimated coecients only
slightly, but leads to a higher level of signicance for lag 1. In order to compare
the magnitude of the coecients with our previous ndings, we evaluate them at
the mean impact of energy shocks. Given a standard deviation of energy shocks
of 0.002, rms in the pulp and paper industry respond to an average shock by
reducing their investment growth by -4.8%. The results are hence highly aligned
with our previous ndings.
7 Conclusion
Private investment has been shown to be one of the main drivers of aggregate out-
put during periods of scal consolidation. Nevertheless, previous literature has
failed to provide a causal link between scal adjustment, business condence and
42On a worldwide scale the pulp and paper industry is considered the fth largest consumer of
energy. One additional advantage of the pulp and paper industry is that the products and manufac-
turing processes are highly standardized and hence a shock on energy prices (tax increase) is likely
to aect all companies in the industry in a very similar fashion.
43Shocks in 1972, 1980, 1987 and 2001. Given the small number of shocks, we focus on realized
investment changes rather than updates in planned investment.
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rm investment. The urge for understanding this channel is even more relevant
in periods of excessive debt and/or decit when the economy needs an eective
growth policy agenda.
Based on a detailed narrative record for tax changes in Germany ( Uhl (2013)),
we reclassify 40 years of scal shocks into "exogenous" and "endogenous" changes
with respect to investment and to the contingent state of the economy. Exploiting
this exogenous variation, we study the eect of a tax change on rms’ realized
and planned investment, considering the IFO investment survey dataset. We nd
that recently published laws and laws under current discussion in the media and
in the parliament shape future investment plans. Taking into account the forward
looking behavior and adjusting the announcement dates according, we nd that
an increase in tax equal to 1% of the value added of the total manufacturing in-
dustry leads to a lagged decrease in planned investment of about 4%. For realized
investment growth we estimate an average eect of 8%
Finally, the use of micro-level rm data allows us to elaborate further on het-
erogeneity in terms of rm size, industry sub sector as well as by type of tax shock.
Dierently from the previous literature, we nd that consumption taxes and in-
come tax adjustments are most harmful for growth as they have the strongest neg-
ative and persistent eect on investment growth at rm level. The nding thus
support recent hypotheses that highlight the importance of the demand channel
in the transmission of scal policies, and may act through future demand expec-
tation.
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8 Appendix
Narrative & Investment data
This section shows some examples of tax changes as discussed and classied in
Uhl (2013). For our purpose of analyzing the eect of exogenous scal tax changes
on investment we revise all structural and consolidation tax measures in Uhl and
reclassify them accordingly in "endogenous" and "exogenous" measures.
An example for an exogenous structural tax measure is given by shock num-
ber 20 in Uhl (2013) ,"Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der oekologischen Steuerreform".
It corresponds to the continuation of the ecological tax reform, published on 22
December 1999, with a total budgetary impact of 10,635 billion Euros it repre-
sents a tax measure with structural motivation that is included in our analysis.
Even though the revenues from the original ecological tax reform were aimed at
reforming the retirement scheme in Germany from a pure pay-as-you go system
to a more capital oriented system (the so-called "Riester Rente"), and hence might
have indirect impact on investment, the continuation law discussed here did not
directly contribute to the structural reform of the pension scheme, and revenues
were not used to reduce the contribution rates to the social security system. The
main argument that dominated the parliamentary debate was that that additional
block grants were used to avoid future increases. We label the tax measure struc-
tural and include it in our analysis.
On the contrary, shock number 28 in Uhl (2013) " Gesetz zur Senkung der
Steuersaetze und zur Reform der Unternehmensbesteuerung", represents a good
example of structural shock that we consider endogenous, dierently from Uhl
(2013) . It refers to a law that has the objective to decrease taxes and reform com-
pany taxation (published in October 2000). This law implemented one of the most
extensive tax reforms in Germany and substantially reduced income - and corpo-
rate tax burden. Furthermore the corporate tax imputation system was replaced
by a 50 percent income taxation rule. The introduction of the bill clearly postu-
lated that the motivation behind the law is to promote growth and employment
by reducing the tax burden. Tax reductions were supposed to stimulate consump-
tion, employment and investment. Therefore we do not included it in our analysis
as it is directly aimed at increasing rm investment activity.
Finally, a good example for a consolidation shock is given by shock number
62 in Uhl (2013), a law published in March 1981, with the objective to increase
petroleum tax and taxes on spirits (Mineraloel und Branntweinsteuer-Aenderungsgesetz
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1981). As pointed out in Uhl (2013), the main motivation behind the law was bud-
getary consolidation. Although structural eects cannot be excluded completely
(in order to improve the structure of tax revenues), consolidation considerations
dominated the discussion.
I(y$1),A) I(y),S) I(y),A) I(y+1),S)
1994)
ΔIy,1) ΔIy,2) ΔIy+1,1) …)
1995)1993)
Figure 6: Timing of the half-yearly investment survey
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Parliament Parliament Newspaper.coverage
Tax.shocks:.Number.in.Uhl.(2013) Publication.date Draft.date Discussion.date Comments
No#5.#Law#for#the#continuation#of#the#
legal#situation#2006#for#commuter's#
tax#allowances
Dec<08
Mar<2009,#
Constitutional#court#
ruling(Dec<2008)
Oct$07 Case+rulings+in+2007+made+clear+that+the+constitutional+court+likely+declares+the+previously+introduced+measure+for+the+"Pendlerpauschale"+unconstitutional.
No#10.#Tax#reform#act#2007
Jul$06 May$06 Nov$05 Negotiation+of+the+coalition+agreement+in+November+2005+defined+list+of+important+changes,+amongst+others+the+commuter's+allowance.
No#12#.Law#for#limitation#of#the#loss#
incorporation#in#the#context#of#tax#
deferral
Dec$05 Nov$05 Apr$04+to+Jun$05 Already#in#April#2004#changes#in#the#classification#of#certain#type#of#life#insurances.#End#of#2004,#same#applies#to#closed#real#estate#investment#funds.#
Law#as#extension#of#these#measures.
No#13.#Law#to#increase#tax#
compliance
Dec<03 Jul<03 Feb<03 Presentation#of#a#white#paper#by#the#Financial#Ministry#in#February#2003#to#
increase#the#declaration#of#unreported#earnings#from#abroad.
No#15.#Reform#of#the#retirement#
income#(AltEinkG)
Jul$04 Dec$03 Mar<03 Commission#established#in#2002.#Report#on#the#reformation#of#the#pension#
scheme#published#in#2003.No+16.+Act+for+the+change+of+the+tobacco+tax+and+other+consumption+taxes Dec<03 Jul<03 May<03 First#press#news#in#May#2003,#however#possibility#to#increase#consumption#taxes#due#to#financial#situation#has#been#already#discussed#in#coalition#negotiations#after#the#federal#elections#in#autumn#2002.No+20+Law+for+the+continuation+of+the+ecological+tax+reform Dec$02 Nov$02 Jun<01 Discussion#of#the#further#development#of#the#ecological#tax.#
No#24.#Law#for#the#reform#of#the#
pension#insurance#and#the#promotion#
of#capital#pension#schemes#(AVmG)
Jun$01 Nov$00 Early+2000 Discussion+of+aging+society+and+unsustainability+of+the+Pay$as$you$go+pension+scheme+in+early+2000.+Presentation+of+the+pension+scheme+reform+in+May+2000.
No#42.#Law#for#the#new#regulation#of#
the#interest#taxation
Nov$92 Apr$92 Jan$92 Press#notes#on#the#discussion#of#the#consistency#with#the#constitution#of#the#
revised#interest#taxation#in#early#January#1992.No+44.+Law+for+the+implementation+of+the+federal+consolidation+package+(FKPG) Jun$93 Mar$93 Feb$91 Coalition#agrees#on#substantial#tax#increases#in#order#to#finance#the#burden#of#the#German#reunification.#Biggest#impact#has#the#solidary#surcharge#on#income#and#wages.
Table 2: Previous news coverage of scal shocks
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Summary statistics and regression tables
This section presents evidence for the representativeness of our sample data for
the overall manufacturing sector in Germany. We compare aggregate rm level
data, obtained as log dierence of total change at time t and time t-1 (d_inv_t) and
a size-weighted average measure of investment changes (d_inv_a_w), with the
benchmark for realized investment changes (gross xed capital formation data
obtained from STAN Industry Rev.3 2008 (OECD).
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Figure 7: Change in aggregate investment: STAN vs. sample aggregation
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Figure 9: Change in aggregate investment in ISIC3 sub sectors vs. exogenous scal shock series
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Figure 10: Change in aggregate investment by size class vs. exogenous scal shock
series
Table 3 and Table 4 present results from the aggregate VAR analysis and pro-
vide evidence that the shock series cannot be predicted by macroeconomic vari-
ables or lagged investment changes. On the other hand, all announced shocks at
time t seem to have an impact on changes in investment (Table 4); the null hy-
pothesis of no granger causality can be rejected at the 10% signicance level.
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Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob4>4chi2 Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob4>4chi2
Exog.4fiscal4shock Interest4rate4(3month) 0.003 1 0.959 Endog.4fiscal4shock Interest4rate4(3month) 2.572 1 0.109
Exog.4fiscal4shock GDP4growth 0.689 1 0.407 Endog.4fiscal4shock GDP4growth 3.447 1 0.063
Exog.4fiscal4shock Change4in4investment 0.172 1 0.678 Endog.4fiscal4shock Change4in4investment 2.141 1 0.143
Exog.4fiscal4shock ALL 1.461 3 0.691 Endog.4fiscal4shock ALL 6.283 3 0.099
D.investment Exog.4fiscal4shock 0.020 1 0.887 D.investment Endog.4fiscal4shock 0.297 1 0.586
D.investment Interest4rate4(3month) 1.426 1 0.232 D.investment Interest4rate4(3month) 1.040 1 0.308
D.investment GDP4growth 1.620 1 0.203 D.investment GDP4growth 1.964 1 0.161
D.investment ALL 2.732 3 0.435 D.investment ALL 3.028 3 0.387
Exogenous4fiscal4shock4and4investment4change4(394obs.) Endogenous4fiscal4shock4and4investment4change4(394obs.)
Table 3: Granger causality test based on 4 variable VAR
Dependent'variable:'Exogenous'fiscal'shock Dependent'variable:'Endogenous'fiscal'shock
beta se beta se
L.1'Change'in'investment >2.626 (2.108) L.1'Change'in'investment >0.335 (>2.005)
L.2'Change'in'investment 1.670 (1.942) L.2'Change'in'investment '''''4.766** (>2.099)
L.1'GDP 0.000 (0.000) L.1'GDP 0.000 (0.000)
L.2'GDP 0.000 (0.000) L.2'GDP 0.000 (0.000)
Observations 39 Observations 39
Pseudo'R2 0.06 Pseudo'R2 0.09
For'the'sample'period'1970>2010'there'are'6'negative For'the'sample'period'1970>2010'there'are'14'negative
adjustment,'25'periods'of'no'action'and'10'years adjustment,'15'periods'of'no'action'and'12'years
with'positive'shocks. with'positive'shocks.
Table 4: Ordered Probit: Insample
Dependent'variable:'Exogenous'fiscal'shock Dependent'variable:'Endogenous'fiscal'shock
beta se beta se
L.1'GFCF ?2.93E?11 (7.81e?11) L.1'GFCF 1.82E?10** (8.15E?11)
L.2'GFCF 5.03E?11 (6.73e?11) L.2'GFCF ?7.13E?11 (6.71E?11)
L.1'GDP ?.000 (0.000) L.1'GDP ?0.002** (0.001)
L.2'GDP 0.000 (0.000) L.2'GDP 0.001** (0.001)
Observations 38 Observations 38
Pseudo'R2 0.05 Pseudo'R2 0.12
For'the'sample'period'1970?2010'there'are'6'negative For'the'sample'period'1970?2010'there'are'14'negative
adjustment,'25'periods'of'no'action'and'10'years adjustment,'15'periods'of'no'action'and'12'years
with'positive'shocks. with'positive'shocks.
Table 5: Ordered Probit: Ocial Statistics (OECD STAN)
37
Table 6: Revision in planned investment
Dependent variable:
Revision in planned investment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
F2.scal shock –5.520*** –4.021* –5.012**
(2.076) (2.148) (2.175)
F.scal shock –2.945* –4.141** –4.033**
(1.769) (1.830) (1.928)
Fiscal shock –1.601 0.103 –0.398 0.050 2.504 1.838
(2.170) (2.264) (2.370) (2.071) (2.184) (2.201)
L.scal shock –2.573* –3.750** –2.149 –5.293*** –6.575*** –5.816***
(1.544) (1.755) (1.892) (1.631) (1.691) (1.901)
L2.scal shock –1.587 –2.018 –0.794 –0.187 –0.325 0.289
(1.681) (1.815) (1.833) (1.679) (1.790) (1.839)
Dummy_autumn 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.086***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Dummy_crisis –0.089*** –0.061*** –0.050** –0.130*** –0.116*** –0.113***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
L.GDP 0.000 –0.000 –0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.030*** –0.042*** –0.031** –0.025*** –0.026*** –0.027**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
L.Sales growth 0.090*** 0.046 0.100*** 0.061*
(0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032)
Observations 25189 19525 19525 23151 19525 19525
R2 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.006
Industry FE Y Y N Y Y N
Firm FE N N Y N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in parentheses.
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Table 7: Halfyearly: discussion date of the scal shock
Dependent variable:
Revision in planned investment (1) (2) (3)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
F2.scal shock –4.831** –3.149 –3.268
(2.452) (2.551) (2.645)
F.scal shock 1.566 1.632 0.933
(2.265) (2.287) (2.406)
Fiscal shock –4.132*** –3.418** –3.941**
(1.498) (1.565) (1.590)
L.scal shock –1.548 –1.736 –1.810
(1.510) (1.564) (1.651)
L2.scal shock –1.910 –0.813 –1.012
(1.816) (1.888) (1.892)
Dummy_autumn 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.085***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Dummy_crisis –0.116*** –0.100*** –0.097***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
L.GDP 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.017** –0.018** –0.020*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
L.Sales growth 0.095*** 0.056*
(0.028) (0.032)
Observations 23151 19525 19525
R2 0.007 0.008 0.006
Industry FE Y Y N
Firm FE N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in
parentheses.
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Table 8: Annual: realized investment change
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
F2.scal shock 2.659*** 1.239 0.584 2.126* 3.085
(0.922) (0.940) (0.945) (1.150) (2.022)
F.scal shock 0.895 0.056 –0.020 0.642 4.563**
(0.896) (0.904) (0.910) (1.208) (1.923)
Fiscal shock –8.949*** –8.502*** –8.724*** –8.789*** –2.359
(0.952) (0.960) (0.960) (1.245) (1.811)
L.scal shock –2.901*** –4.682*** –4.853*** –1.704 –7.072***
(0.849) (0.876) (0.883) (1.056) (1.824)
L2.scal shock 0.858 –1.757* –2.164** 0.529 –3.275*
(0.941) (0.986) (0.993) (1.248) (1.895)
Dummy_90 –0.270*** –0.276***
(0.018) (0.018)
Dummy_crisis –0.098*** –0.097*** 0.065
(0.032) (0.036) (0.051)
L.GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** –0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.028*** –0.028*** –0.047*** –0.047***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005)
L.Sales growth 0.032 0.053 0.000
(0.031) (0.034) (0.056)
Observations 43738 43738 42046 23024 19022
R2 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.013
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in parentheses.
40
Table 9: Heterogeneous eects: Tax type
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
Income tax –13.956*** –18.096***
(2.298) (1.925)
L.Income tax –5.670** –5.808***
(2.403) (1.963)
Property and Corp tax –7.958*** –12.959***
(2.052) (1.575)
L.Property and Corp tax 0.947 –6.606***
(2.037) (1.474)
Consumption tax 0.176 –6.754***
(2.998) (2.533)
L.Consumption tax –17.392*** –17.800***
(3.044) (2.550)
Dummy_90 –0.225*** –0.213*** –0.239*** –0.191***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Dummy_crisis –0.227*** –0.207*** –0.240*** –0.216***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
L.GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.023*** –0.026*** –0.027*** –0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
L.Sales growth –0.002 –0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 54261 54261 54261 54261
R2 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006
Industry FE Y Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in parentheses.
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Table 10: Heterogeneous eects: direct vs. indirect taxes
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
Direct taxes –9.720*** –10.228*** –9.869***
(1.086) (1.114) (1.102)
L.Direct taxes –0.906 –1.641 –0.959
(1.081) (1.106) (1.087)
Indirect taxes 3.054 2.449 3.298
(3.053) (3.097) (3.160)
L.Indirect taxes –16.265*** –15.903*** –16.055***
(2.778) (2.822) (2.844)
Observations 53164 53164 53164
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Controls Y Y Y
Anticipated shocks N N Y
Industry FE Y N Y
Firm FE N Y N
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm
level in parentheses.
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Table 11: Results from GMM Model (Bond et. al (2003))
Dependent variable:
Investment / Assets (1) (2) (3)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
L. Investment / Assets 0.222*** 0.218*** 0.236***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Sales growth 0.294*** 0.256*** 0.254***
(0.088) (0.081) (0.111)
L.Sales growth 0.145*** 0.137*** 0.153***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.030)
L2.(Assets - Sales) –0.103*** –0.100*** –0.124***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.030)
F.scal shock –0.094
(1.001)
Fiscal shock –1.461**
(0.681)
L.scal shock –1.101*
(0.665)
Hansen (p-value) 0.01 0.05 0.13
Arellano-Bond (AR1) -17.34 -17.72 -15.91
Arellano-Bond (AR2) 1.67 1.75 1.76
Observations 10761 10761 9524
Firms 1875 1875 1798
Year FE Y N N
Aggregate controls N Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation by SYS-GMM using the
one-step estimator. Hansen test (p-value) for over identication re-
strictions reported. We follow the same selection of instruments as
in Bond et. al (2003)
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Table 12: Results from Di-in-Di: Energy tax
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3)
(β / (SE) (β / (SE) (β / (SE)
Energy tax X paper industry 3.608 3.410 6.921
(13.553) (13.554) (14.011)
L.Energy tax X paper industry –23.134* –23.532* –24.323**
(12.269) (12.272) (12.289)
L2.Energy tax X paper industry –20.403 –20.356 –20.427
(12.683) (12.697) (13.105)
Energy tax –1.535 –1.517 –3.133
(8.436) (8.435) (8.806)
L.Energy tax 4.927 5.158 4.569
(7.952) (7.958) (7.972)
L2.Energy tax –10.747 –10.927 –12.773
(9.005) (9.020) (9.230)
Pulp & Paper 0.039***
(0.013)
Observations 12960 12960 12960
R2 0.004 0.004 0.004
Controls Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y N
Firm FE N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in
parentheses.
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Table 13: Aggretated results: by ISIC 3 subsector
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE) β / (SE)
Fiscal shock –3.689*** –3.689*** –2.301* –2.278**
(1.120) (0.816) (1.054) (0.864)
L.scal shock –2.674** –2.682*** –2.279** –2.958***
(1.182) (0.760) (0.772) (0.740)
L2.scal shock –.635 –0.640 –1.091 –1.493
(1.557) (2.124) (2.065) (2.021)
Fiscal shock anticipated –0.018
(0.689)
L.scal shock anticipated 0.181
(0.421)
L2.scal shock anticipated 2.011*
(0.989)
Fiscal shock endog. 1.209*
(0.649)
L.scal shock endog. –1.129
(0.679)
L2.scal shock endog. –3.316***
(0.589)
Dummy_90 –0.248*** –0.249*** –0.253*** –0.202***
(0.0402) (0.027) (0.029) (0.038)
Dummy_crisis –0.151*** –0.151*** –0.176*** –0.1678***
(0.043) (0.037) (0.046) (0.034)
L.GDP_index 0.696*** 0.697*** 0.689*** 0.589***
(0.135) (0.101) (0.097) (0.122)
L.3 month interbank rate –.0171*** –0.171*** –0.0183*** –0.011*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 465 465 465 465
R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.16
Industry FE N Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at rm level in parentheses.
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